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ARBITRATION OF TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
CLAIMS

MARSHALLE.TRACHT

In recent years, it has become increasingly common for lenders to include arbitration clauses in their consumer financing agreements. While foderallaw
strongly supports the enforceability ofarbitration provisions, there are a number ofgrounds on which their enforceability can be, and has been, challenged.
This article summarizes the state ofthe law on a number of major issues
which have arisen in the attempt to use arbitration clauses in consumer financing agreements, focusing on Truth-in-Lending Act claims, including an analysis
ofthe Supreme Court's recent decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph.

n recent years, many financial institutions have begun adding arbitration
clauses to their consumer financial agreements, believing arbitration to
be a less expensive and friendlier forum than state or federal courts.
Among the most important advantages of mandatory arbitration is that it
may prevent consumers from converting their individual complaints into
class action lawsuits. Despite strong public policies favoring arbitration,
however, courts sometimes decline to enforce such agreements, on a variety
of grounds: that the arbitration clause is unconscionable, that it conflicts
with the fundamental purposes of the Truth in Lending Act or other statutory protections, or that the arbitration procedures specified were too costly
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for the consumer or otherwise unfair.
Many had been looking forward to the Supreme Court's decision in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, I a case concerning the enforceability
of an arbitration clause contained in a mobile home financing agreement, as
a potential source of guidance on these various issues. Although the decision, issued this past December, addressed only two fairly narrow issues, it
nonetheless provides an opportune moment to review the state of the law in
this increasingly important area.

FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Historically, courts were highly resistant to arbitration agreements,
believing that they improperly deprived the courts of their rightful jurisdiction. 2 To overcome this judicial hostility Congress passed the Federal
Arbitration Act in 1925,3 providing that arbitration clauses were to be treated as binding in the same manner as every other contractual agreement:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy arising our of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 4
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the FAA evinces a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and that courts must
"rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."5 Moreover, in interpreting an
arbitration clause, "due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring
arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself
resolved in favor of arbitration. "6
Despite the policies favoring arbitration, however, there are grounds on
which an arbitration clause may be held unenforceable. As the FAA states,
arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity" to challenge any contract. Thus, an arbitration clause will
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not be enforced where one party has not consented to the provision, or
where the clause is unconscionable, or if arbitration poses an inherent conflict with other important public policies.

CONSENT TO ARBITRATION
A threshold inquiry in any attempt to compel arbitration of a claim is
whether the other party has in fact consented to arbitration.? Courts have
split on the evidence that will be adequate to prove consent, however. Some
have applied a relatively lenient standard, holding that the consent required
to bind a party to an arbitration clause is no greater than that required for
any other provision. Thus, an arbitration clause included in the fine print of
a contract may be enforceable, even if the consumer never noticed it. 8
In Marsh v. First USA Bank,9 for example, the court upheld the enforceability of an arbitration clause contained in an amendment to the credit card
agreement that had been sent to the consumer as in insert to a monthly statement. Although the card holders alleged that they did not receive notice of
the provision, the court held that the evidence showing that the insert had
in all probability been mailed was sufficient to raise the presumption that the
card holders had received the insert. Affidavits by the card holders alleging
that they had not received the insert were insufficient to rebut this presumption absent evidence of irregularities or carelessness in the process of
sending the inserts to card holders.lO Thus, the card holders were presumed
to have had notice of the arbitration provision, and it was enforceable against
them despite their allegation that they had never seen or been aware of the
provision.
Other courts, however, have held that an arbitration clause is not binding on a consumer who has not knowingly agreed to submit to arbitration. II
Though these courts acknowledge that arbitration clauses may not be singled out for stricter scrutiny than other contract clauses.

UNCONSCIONABILITY
A court always has the option of refusing to enforce a provision that is
"unconscionable." Although the law varies from state to state, most states

5

BANKING LAW JOURNAL

require a showing of both procedural unconscionability and substantial
unconscionability to apply the doctrine.12
The procedural unconscionability issue may be relatively easy for plaintiffs to prevail on in many consumer cases. After all, the arbitration clauses
at issue are "take it or leave it" propositions for the consumer, and so many
courts will consider them to be terms of adhesion. 13
The question of substantive unconscionability is more difficult, however. There are almost as many statements of the standard for substantive
unconscionability as there are cases on the subject, but generally it requires
a showing of grossly inequitable terms, of terms so one sided as to be
oppressive. 14
Consumers have sometimes argued that arbitration clauses were not
enforceable because they lacked "mutuality"-that is, they did not impose
the obligation to arbitrate equally on both sides. 15 Not surprisingly, courts
eventually began to reject this claim, noting that, as in other areas of contract, mutuality in any particular term is not required so long as the contract
as a whole is supported by consideration. 16 However, the concept of mutuality appears to be retaining at least some vitality under the guise of unconscionability. Courts have most often struck down arbitration clauses as
unconscionable where the clause provided different rights for the business
and the consumer. Thus, a provision that permitted an insurer to appeal any
arbitration award in excess of a given amount, but that did not permit the
consumer to appeal if the award was less, has been held unconscionable. 17 A
number of decisions in this area are particularly troubling for lenders, who
have good reasons for wanting to except certain actions (to enforce a note or
foreclose on collateral, for example) from arbitration. Some courts have held
that such provisions are unfair and unenforceable because they preserve
access to the courts for the lender, but not for the borrower. IS Other courts,
not surprisingly, have rejected these challenges. 19

ARBITRATION MUST BE FAIR
In practice, the unconscionability analysis often blends into a separate
line of argument, that the arbitration provided for by the contract is itself
biased or unfair. For an arbitration clause to be enforceable, the arbitration
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process must offer an adequate forum for the resolution of the dispute and
must not deprive the plaintiff of the ability to vindicate her rights. Thus,
courts have been willing to strike down arbitration clauses where the arbitration forum was unduly costly, reasoning that extreme costs effectively
deny relief to the complainant. 20 Courts have also denied arbitration where
the arbitrator appeared to be biased21 or the arbitration proceedings did not
provide minimal procedural protections. 22
In Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., Green Tree had financed the
plaintiff's purchase of a mobile home. The plaintiff later filed a class action
suit under TILA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, alleging that the
defendant had failed to properly identify certain lender's insurance premiums as a financing cost. The trial court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration, dismissed all other claims, and declined to certify the class.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit refused to compel the arbitration ofTILA
claims, holding the arbitration provision unenforceble because it failed to
address the payment of filing fees, the apportionment of the costs of arbitration or whether, if the plaintiff prevailed, fees and costs would exceed any
award. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the contract "fail[ed] to provide
the minimum guaranties required to ensure that [the plaintiff's] ability to
vindicate her statutory rights [under the TILA would] not be undone by
steep filing fees, steep arbitrators' fees, or other high costs of arbitration."23
Given the limited damages available to the plaintiff in many TILA suits,
particularly if the avenue of a class action has been foreclosed, it is likely that
even modest arbitration costs could exceed the possible recovery. In Wood v.
Cooper Chevrolet, for example, the court refused to order arbitration of a
TILA claim under the American Arbitration Association rules, which provide for arbitration costs to be equally shared unless the arbitrator orders
otherwise, even though the defendant had agreed to front the arbitration
costs. The court reasoned that if a defendant retains the right to seek reimbursement of the costs after the proceeding, this renders TILA claims "economically unfeasable," and "the purpose of the TILA will be eviscerated
because potential defendants will have no incentive to abide by its provisions."24
If allowed to stand, the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Green Tree
and of Cooper Chevrolet would be troubling for lenders, to say the least.
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Cooper Chevrolet does not definitively say that the defendant must surrender
the right to seek reimbursement of fees by order of the arbitrator should the
defendant prevail, but that is certainly a plausible reading of the case. Under
this strict standard, the only way a defendant could enforce an arbitration
clause is to agree to pay the fees of arbitration and to forego the right to
recover those fees from the plaintiff. Moreover, the court does not address
why a plaintiff is harmed by having to pay arbitration costs when the alternative is to file a law suit, a process likely to be as or more expensive. 25
The Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree should provide lenders with
at least some comfort on this score. The Court addressed two issues: first,
whether the district court's order was a "final order" subject to immediate
appeal; and second, whether the failure ro deal with the costs of arbitration
rendered the clause unenforceable.
On the first question, the Court held that the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing all claims was a final order amenable to
immediate appeal. 26 This ruling can be seen as a victory for consumers and
plaintiffs' attorneys. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, it is clear that an
order denying arbitration is immediately appealable, so lenders seeking to
enforce an arbitration provisions have always had the opportunity to seek
review of an adverse ruling. 27
The Court's holding that an order compelling arbitration and dismissing
all other claims is an appealable final order now increases the likelihood that
a consumer challenging the enforceability of an arbitration clause will be able
to appeal an adverse ruling without first submitting to the arbitration.
On the question of costs, however, the Court's ruling favored arbitrability. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held the arbitration
clause enforceable despite Randolph's allegation that steep arbitration fees
might render arbitration inaccessible to her.28 High fees might be grounds
to invalidate an arbitration clause, according to the Court, but the burden
rests on the party resisting arbitration to show that it would be unduly
expensive, an evidentiary burden that Randolph did not meet. 29 Any other
ruling, according to Justice Rehnquist, would "undermine the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."30
As the Court noted, many arbitration services have consumer arbitration provisions or small claims provisions that keep consumer fees to a min-
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imum in many cases. 3) The clause in Green Tree was silent as to the arbitration provider, but many clauses specify the organization or rules that will
govern the arbitration proceeding. An arbitration clause specifying that arbitration will be according to the rules of an organization with reasonable consumer arbitration provisions should preclude a challenge like Randolph's.
Indeed, in the wake of Green Tree, an arbitration clause that is silent as to the
arbitration rules should be valid provided the defendant agree to arbitration
in a forum with reasonable provisions governing consumer fees.
It is important to note, however, that the Court did not reject the underlying premise of the Circuit Court's opinion, which is that high arbitration
costs may render an arbitration provision unenforceable. Indeed, the Court
recognized this point, holding only that Randolph could not prevail by
showing that the agreement was silent as to costs; rather, she had to be put
on affirmative evidence as the costs to which she would be subjected. This
clarification regarding the burden of proof is an important, but partial, victory for lenders.
It is worth noting two issues that the Supreme Court expressly declined
to address. First, the Court stated that Randolph had not argued that the
Congress intended for the Truth-in-Lending Act to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies, so the Court did not address that question. 32 On a closely related point, the Court also declined to consider whether the arbitration
clause could be held unenforceable because arbitration would effectively
deny the plaintiff the ability to proceed with her class action claims.33 It is to
this latter issue that we now turn.

ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTION SUITS
One of the most important potential benefits of binding arbitration is
that it may preclude a consumer from filing a class action lawsuit against the
defendant. It is not necessarily impossible for an arbitrator to preside over a
consolidated or class action proceeding B courts in both California and
Pennsylvania have blessed the concept of class action arbitration proceedings. 34 However, federal courts have generally resisted the idea of class action
arbitration absent explicit contractual language permitting it, arguing that
"[f]or a federal court to read such a term into the parties' agreement would
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disrupt the negotiated risk/benefit allocation and direct [the parties] to proceed with a different sort of arbitration."35
Moreover, class action arbitrations are precluded by the rules and procedures of many arbitration agencies. If the arbitration clause provides that
arbitration will be handled by a particular organization, and that organization's rules do not permit class action arbitrations, then enforcement of the
arbitration clause will prevent the consumer from enlarging the suit to
encompass an entire class of plaintiffs.
However, if class actions and arbitration are inconsistent, that does not
necessarily determine which should prevail in a conflict. In the last two
years, courts have split over the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration
clause that has the effect of precluding a class action lawsuit. 36 Many of these
cases have been fought out in the context of technical Truth in Lending Act
claims, where a single plaintiff would be limited to $1,000 in damages, but
a class could obtain an award of up to $500,000. 37 Obviously, absent the class
action mechanism, few consumers (or plaintiffs' attorneys) would bring suits
alleging purely technical violations ofTILA.
The argument advanced by plaintiffs in these cases is that class action
lawsuits are the primary means of enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act,
and that Congress created an explicit right under TILA for plaintiffs to bring
class actions. The standard for such a claim, asserting a conflict between the
FAA and another statutory right, was set out by the Supreme Court in
ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon:
The [FAA], standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the
[FAA's] mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at;)ssue. If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent
will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history, or from
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes. 38
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Many of the TILA cases have hinged on the court's analysis of the role
of class action litigation in TILA's the enforcement scheme. Those courts
that have found that Congress expressly granted to plaintiffs the right to
bring class action suits have generally concluded that arbitration cannot be
ordered, as it deprives the plaintiff of an essential remedy. In Lozada v. Dale
Banker Oldsmobile, for example, the federal district court declined to order
arbitration ofTILA claims, reasoning that by precluding class action litigation, "the remedial purposes ofTILA are substantially defeated or impaired
by arbitration clauses such as the clause in this case."39
The district court in Johnson v. Tete-Cash, Inc. accepted the same argument, only to be reversed by the Third Circuit, which reasoned that TILA
does not create a substantive right to bring a class action and that the class
action device is merely procedural. 40 Thus, arbitration may be compelled
without depriving the plaintiff of a substantive right or remedy. Moreover,
the court held that there is no inherent conflict between arbitration and
TILA's statutory scheme. The court rejected the argument that arbitration,
by precluding class action suits, would eliminate the incentive for plaintiffs
to bring TILA action, noting that a class action does necessarily result in
higher awards for the individual plaintiff and that attorneys' fees are available under TILA and can be awarded by an arbitrator. 4!
Regardless of the outcome of this debate, however, plaintiffs will seek
ways to maintain class actions in many cases. If the availability of a class
action is explicitly provided under another statute (such as state consumer
protection laws, for example), then the plaintiff may prevail on the argument
that those claims are not arbitrable. 42 Even such a finding, however, will not
prevent the court from ordering that arbitrable claims be submitted to arbitration regardless of how intertwined the arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims
may be. 43 The result may be an increase in dispute resolution costs, as related matters are handled in parallel proceedings (although the court proceeding will often be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration).44

CONCLUSION
There are many pitfalls to be avoided in the drafting of an arbitration
clause, and it still unclear precisely what terms may be permitted, and which
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may created problems down the road. Lenders must be particularly concerned about those cases which cast doubt on the enforceability of an arbitration clause that retains the lender's right to bring various actions, particular real or personal property foreclosure actions, in court. Provisions that
saddle consumers with undue costs, or that forbid the award of attorney's
fees to a prevailing consumer, may also be problematic. On the vital question, however, of whether arbitration clauses can shield a lender from consumer class action litigation, the answer appears to be trending towards
"yes".
However, until the Supreme Court (or Congress) provides a definitive
rule, lenders should consider it a weak shield at best. A!; long as some districts or circuits are willing to hold that TlLA class action suits are not
amenable to arbitration, this will be an element in the forum selection decision made by plaintiffs' attorneys, not a bar to class action proceedings.
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23 178 E3d at 1158.
24 102 ESupp.2d at 1352.
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recovery because the arbitration is not a class action, but that in a judicial forum, the
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the costs. Yet in the Cooper Chevrolet case, it was far from clear that a class action
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26 121 S.Ct. at 519-21.
The issue here was whether an order compelling arbitration and dismissing all claims is a final order in an "embedded proceeding" B that
is, a suit including both a request for arbitration and other claims for relief. Some
Circuit Courts had held that an order compelling arbitration is final in an "independent proceeding" B where no relief beyond the arbitration order is sought B but
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Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc., v. Chrysler Corp. 143 E3d 626 (1st Cir. 1998);
Altman Nursing, Inc. v. Clay Capital Corp., 84 E3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996); Gammaro
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27 See 9 U.S.c. A. section 16(a)(1)(C): ''An appeal may be taken from B (1) an
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28
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29
30
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Id.
Id. [internal quotes and citations omitted].
Id. at 524. For example, the American Arbitration Association handles consumer

cases valued under $10,000 under its Arbitration Rules for the Resolution of
ConsumerReiated Disputes, which require no fee from the consumer and limit the
consumer's share of the arbitrator's fees to $125. In Dobbins v. Hawk's Enterprises,
198 E3d 715 (8th Cir. 1999), the district court had permitted a TIlA suit to continue despite an arbitration clause, on grounds that plaintiff could not afford the
AA!\s fee determination of $23,000. The Circuit Court reversed, holding that the
plaintiff had not fully explored the AA!\s fee waiver procedures, and that the fee
determination was based on the plaintiff's damage claim of $50 million and would
be much less if a "more realistic" damage figure were used. Thus, the court remand-
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New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 E2d 1, 5 (lst Cir.1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1077, 109 S.Ct. 1527,103 L.Ed.2d 832 (1989) (holding that district court may order consolidated arbitration, even though not expressly authorized
by parties' agreement, if underlying state law specifically authorizes consolidated
arbitration) .
36 Cases refusing to enforce mandatory arbitration that would preclude a class
action proceeding include LozatUz v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 ESupp.2d 1087
(WD. Mich. 2000) (TlLA claims); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821 (Bankr. N.D.Ala.
1999); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (breach of
contract and deceptive trade practices claims). Cases enforcing arbitration clauses
despite the effect of precluding a class action include lohmon v. west Suburban Bank,
225 E3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000) (TlLA and Electronic Funds Transfer Act claims);
Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 ESupp.2d 909 (N.D.Tex. 2000) (TlLA claims);
Thompson v. Illinois Title Loam, Inc., 2000 WL 45493 (N.D. Ill. 2000); and Sagal
v. First USA Bank, N.A., 69 ESupp.2d 627 (D.Del. 1999) (TlLA claims).
37 15 U.S.c. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
38 ShearsoniAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27, 107 S.Ct.
2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (inrernal citations and quotation marks omitted).
39 91 ESupp.2d at 1105.
40 See, e.g., lohmon v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 E Supp.2d 264 (D. Del. 1999), rev'd sub
nom, lohmon v. west Suburban Bank, 225 E3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Though the
statute clearly contemplates class actions, there are no provisions within the law that
create a right to bring them, or evince an intenr by Congress that claims initiated as
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class actions be exempt from binding arbitration clauses. The "right" to proceed to
a class action, insofar as the TILA is concerned, is a procedural one that arises from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. "); see also WUod v. Cooper
Chevrolet, Inc., 102 ESupp.2d 1345 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (rejecting the claim that
Congress intended to preclude arbitration ofTILA claims, but finding the arbitration provision unenforceable on other grounds); Gammaro v. Thorp Comumer
Discount Co., 828 E Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that a court cannot order
class arbitration ofTILA claims where the arbitration clause makes no provision for
such proceedings, and the arbitration agreement therefore requires dismissal of
plaintiff's motion to certify the class), app. dism'd, 15 E3d 93 (8th Cir. 1994);
Marsh v. First USA Bank, NA., 103 ESupp.2d 909,922-24 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that TILA does not create a right to bring a class action proceeding and arbitration is therefore not inconsistent with TILA's statutory scheme); Thompson v. Illinois
Title Loans, Inc., 2000 WL 45493 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same).
41 225 E3d at 374-75.
42 See, e.g., Lozada, 91 ESupp.2d at 1105 (noting that the right to class recovery is
expressly granted by the Michigan Consumer Protection Act).
43 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84
L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (holding that "that the Arbitration Act requires district courts
to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the· parties files a
motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.")
44 Cf C Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan International Co., 552 E2d 1228, 1231 (7th
Cir.1977) ("[c]on~iderations of judicial economy bear no relation to 'the making
and performance of an agreement to arbitrate,' and to permit a district court to deny
a stay pending arbitration based on such discretionary considerations would, in our
opinion, frustrate the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration which is expressed
in the Federal Arbitration Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court").
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